Denmark and Norway Investigate Security Vulnerabilities in Chinese-Made Transit Buses

The specter of Chinese technological infiltration has arrived at an unexpected destination: the orderly bus routes of Scandinavia. What was once considered a straightforward matter of public transportation procurement has evolved into a pressing national security concern for Denmark and Norway.

Transit authorities in both nations have discovered that hundreds of Chinese-manufactured buses operating in their cities contain a capability that few anticipated when the vehicles were purchased. These buses, built by Yutong of Zhengzhou, China, can be remotely disabled through wireless software access, according to officials now scrambling to address the vulnerability.

Jeppe Gaard, chief operating officer of Denmark’s Movia transit system, confirmed the security gap in a statement this week. The buses in question can receive software updates and diagnostic tests through wireless connections, meaning they could be “stopped remotely, either by the manufacturer or by a hacker.” Denmark’s fleet includes 262 Yutong vehicles that have entered service since 2019, serving Copenhagen and surrounding areas.

The issue first came to light when Norway’s Ruter transit operator conducted tests inside a mountain facility, comparing Chinese-made Yutong buses with vehicles from Dutch manufacturer VDL. The results proved illuminating. While the Dutch buses lacked remote software update capabilities, the Chinese vehicles maintained direct digital connections to the manufacturer for updates and diagnostics. In theory, Ruter concluded, these buses could be stopped or rendered inoperable by the manufacturer, though they could not be remotely driven.

Yutong has responded with assurances. The company stated it “strictly complies with the applicable laws, regulations, and industry standards” and maintains that its European Union vehicle data resides in an Amazon Web Services facility in Frankfurt, Germany, protected by encryption and access controls. Without customer authorization, the company insists, no one can access or operate the systems.

Yet these assurances may ring hollow to European security officials increasingly wary of Chinese technological dependence. This incident represents merely the latest chapter in Europe’s increasingly complicated relationship with Beijing. European nations find themselves caught between economic necessity and security prudence, reliant on Chinese trade and manufacturing capacity while simultaneously confronting allegations of Chinese cyber-aggression, intellectual property theft, and human rights violations.

The situation underscores a broader challenge facing Western nations. As Gaard noted, this vulnerability extends beyond Chinese buses alone. Any vehicle or device with sophisticated electronics and internet connectivity faces similar risks. The difference lies in the geopolitical implications when that access point traces back to a nation increasingly viewed as a strategic competitor.

For decades, Western nations assumed that commercial relationships would remain separate from security considerations. That assumption has proven dangerously naive. Infrastructure once considered purely civilian in nature now represents potential leverage points in any future conflict or diplomatic crisis.

The Scandinavian discovery serves as a warning to other nations that may have prioritized cost savings over security considerations in their infrastructure investments. As tensions between the West and China continue to simmer over Taiwan, trade practices, and technological supremacy, the question is no longer whether Chinese-made infrastructure poses risks, but rather how quickly those risks can be identified and mitigated.

China’s Ministry of Commerce has not yet responded to requests for comment on the matter. That silence, intended or not, speaks volumes about the asymmetric nature of this technological relationship.